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Abstract. Using crowdsourcing for solving disputes is a subject that has not been 
discussed in many scientific publications. However, since Crowdsourced Online Dispute 
Resolution (CODR) provides a cheap, fast, and democratic dispute resolution, it has a potential 
that needs to be explored scientifically. How should eBay solve otherwise 60 millions disputes per 
year? Building a CODR platform with the convenience and attractiveness of other collective 
intelligence systems, such as Wikipedia, YouTube, and Google, may cause many variants of 
traditional forms of dispute resolution fading away. In order to shed more light on CODR, the 
present contribution defines this new type of dispute resolution, describes the present state of play, 
and builds a theoretical framework by investigating CODR building blocks. Although the paper 
provides only the start of a profound discussion, it shows introductory explorations of the key 
theoretical issues involved in CODR. 
1. Introduction 
Ever since the creation of Google, there has been a steady increase in the number of websites using “the wisdom 
of the crowd”. Wikipedia and the Amazon’s Mechanical Turk are just two telling examples. At present, 
outsourcing certain tasks to large groups of people is easy, even for a layman. Yet, any attempt to define this 
phenomenon has become one of the most challenging ventures of the last five years. For the purpose of this 
contribution, we will call this phenomenon crowdsourcing and define it as it is defined by Surowiecki (2006).  
 
 “Crowdsourcing is (1) the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent 
(usually an employee) and (2) outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of people 
in the form of an open call” (Surowiecki, 2006).  
 
While crowdsourcing is often used in many different areas, its use in the area of law is not very popular. At 
present, there are only a couple of websites providing Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) that uses crowdsourcing 
as a part of the dispute resolution process. We call this new form of dispute resolution: Crowdsourced Online 
Dispute Resolution (CODR). Since, up to this moment, CODR has not been discussed scientifically, the present 
paper aims to clarify this issue by giving a definition of CODR (Section 2), discussing the current state of play of 
CODR (Section 3) and the building blocks of CODR (Section 4). Finally, we provide a conclusion (Section 5). 
2. Defining CODR 
For our definition of the term CODR, we use the definition of ODR as provided by Kaufmann-Kohler and 
Schultz (2004). 
  
“ODR is a broad term that encompasses forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and 
court proceedings which use internet as a part of the dispute resolution process” (Kaufmann-
Kohler and  Schultz, 2004, p.7).  
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  On the basis of this definition, we provide the following definition of CODR.  
 
CODR is a term that encompasses some forms of ADR and court proceedings using internet 
and crowdsourcing as parts of the dispute resolution process. 
 
To clarify CODR more precisely, we need also to delineate the crowd that participates in CODR. We define 
it as follows.  
 
The crowd is a (generally large) group of people who participates in the dispute resolution 
process through an open call. 
 
 Here, some clarifications need to be made on the term “open call”. In our view, two requirements must be 
met to classify a call as “open”.   The first requirement is that everyone from the online community where the 
call is published should be entitled to participate in CODR if she meets certain conditions.1 For instance, a 
condition can be that only users of a website who have been registered for a certain time can participate in 
CODR, as it is the case at the eBay’s Community Review Forum (http://www.ebaycourt.com). A second 
condition can be that only the first n members of the crowd (e.g., n = 30) can participate in CODR.2 
  
The second requirement for classification of a call as “open” is that it should be published or made available 
in such a way that every member of the online community where the open call is published should be able to find 
information about it.  
3. State of Play of CODR 
 At present, there are only a few CODR procedures.3 On the basis of their functions, we classify them into three 
types: (1) online opinion polls, (2) online mock trials, (3) CODR procedures rendering decisions that are 
enforced by private authorities. It should be noted that, since online mock trials do not constitute a real dispute 
resolution, their classification as a form of CODR is questionable. However, since the process used by online 
mock trials has some features in common with the dispute resolution process we will fictively accept that they 
are a sui generis form of CODR. Two common features between the mock trials and dispute resolution process 
are: (1) a case submission which consists of facts from the perspectives of each party and (2) the publication of a 
verdict by a jury. The classification of the mock trials as a form of CODR is also supported by the fact that mock 
trials are sometimes used as an ADR tool, in which parties that are not inclined to negotiate may see how the 
merits of their respective cases stand when argued in front of neutral evaluators. Below, we will discuss the three 
types of CODR procedures in subsections 3.1 to 3.3. 
3.1 Online Opinion Polls 
Typical examples of online opinion polls are iCourthouse (www.icourthouse.com), SideTaker 
(www.sidetaker.com), AllRise (www.allrise.com),People’sCourtRaw(www.peoplescourtraw.com),Truveli 
(www.truveli.org). Such CODR procedures (1) give a party who feels subject to injustice an opportunity to 
express her feelings and ask for the support from the society, (2) allow the parties to post their disputes  
 
                                                          
1
 The members of the crowd can participate in CODR as jurors, arbitrators, mediators, and facilitators of negotiations 
   For brevity, we use ‘she’ or ‘her’ where ‘she or he’ and ‘his or her’ are meant. 
2
 It should be noted that CODR can also exists without requiring the crowd to meet any conditions to participate in the 
procedure. 
3
 See, for example, iCourthouse (www.icourthouse.com), SideTaker (www.sidetaker.com), AllRise (www.allrise.com), 
eBay’s Community Review Forum (ECRF), (http://www.ebaycourt.com). 
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anonymously, (3) provide a commonsense judgment, (4) do not require legalistic language, (5) and offer 
convenient and non-cost procedures (Marder, 2006, pp. 242 – 244). However, the procedures are often full with 
trivial and silly claims, and allow a single person to register multiple times which makes such polls not 
representative. Also, the jurors are often introduced to the case by viewing the responses of the other jurors 
which lead to informational and reputational cybercascades (Marder, 2006, pp. 245 – 247). In an informational 
cybercascade, there is a point where people cease relying on their personal opinions. Instead, they decide on the 
basis of the signals conveyed by others. Consequently, the behavior of the first few people produces similar 
behavior from a large number of followers. In a reputational cybercascade, people neglect their personal 
opinions and go along with the crowd in order to maintain the good opinion of others (Sunstein, 2009, pp. 83-
86).  
3.2 Online Mock Trials 
Typical examples of websites offering online mock trials are eJury (www.ejury.com) and VirtualJury 
(www.virtualjury.com). CODR procedures functioning as online mock trials are used by lawyers who have to 
handle actual cases. Since the jurors in the online mock trials undergo a screening process ensuring unbiased and 
impartial opinions, the outcomes of such procedures are much more representative than the outcomes of the 
online opinion polls. That is why they are used to provide important feedback to the lawyers and serve as 
diagnostic tools (Marder, 2006, pp. 249 – 251). Also, it should be noted that such procedures are quick and 
inexpensive.  
3.3 CODR rendering decisions enforced by private authorities 
The code of cyberspace (the set of protocols, the set of rules, implemented or codified in the software of 
cyberspace that determine how people interact, or exist, in this space) provides a perfect regulation because it 
does not allow deviation from the structures established by this architecture (Lessig, 1998). The code is as 
important as the law in defining and defeating the liberties of the Internet.  Therefore, decisions enforced through 
the code will have a binding force alternative to the enforcement power of the state. In this regard, the first well 
known dispute resolution procedure of which the decisions are enforced through the code by a private authority 
is the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). The enforcement of the decisions rendered by 
UDRP panels is performed by cancelation, transfer or other changes to domain name registrations. Later on, 
taking into account the example of UDRP, eBay launched the eBay’s Community Review Forum (ECRF), a 
website offering a CODR procedure of which the decisions are enforced by a private authority (eBay).  The 
ECRF can be regarded as a groundbreaking step in the development of CODR. The futuristic idea that a dispute 
can be effectively solved at no cost by a large group of people located in many different countries in 30 minutes 
after submitting the claim has become reality. At present, ECRF allows eBay members to appeal only against 
negative feedback they have received on eBay.  The final decision of the jury is enforced by an eBay Customer 
Service Representative, who, if appropriate, removes the feedback. 
4. Building blocks of CODR 
CODR is a collective intelligence system. On the basis of a study by Malone and Dellarocas (Malone and 
Dellarocas, 2009), four building blocks are distinguished in almost every collective intelligence system. We 
adopt the idea that CODR is also built on four building blocks:  (1) staffing, (2) incentives, (3) goal, (4) 
structure/process.  In the context of CODR, these building blocks can be defined as: (1) the crowd, (2) incentives 
motivating the crowd to participate in CODR, (3) types of disputes which can be solved through CODR, and (4) 
the CODR procedure. We will discuss these four building blocks in the next subsections. 
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4.1 The crowd  
As mentioned above, the crowd is a generally large group of people participating in the dispute resolution 
process through an open call. However, in order to clarify the term crowd, two questions need to be answered: 
(1) should the crowd be viewed as a single entity or as a sum of independent individuals and (2) in order to settle 
disputes adequately, should the crowd be diverse (in nationality, geographical location, education, age, etc.)? 
As to the first question, we have to find a criterion for differentiating between a collective decision and an 
aggregation of decisions.  In this regard, a definition of a “collective decision” provided by Tideman can be 
helpful. He states the following. 
 
“A collective decision occurs when members of a collectivity make individual decisions that 
they would not make if the other members of the collectivity were not making related 
decisions. A collective decision thus entails coordination of intentions” (Tideman, 2006, p.5).  
 
   Since a collective decision entails coordination of intentions, it is present if there is communication amongst 
the members of the crowd with regard to the dispute. Obviously, communications amongst the members of the 
crowd allow coordination of intentions. So, if the members of the crowd are able to communicate with each 
other, the crowd should be regarded as a single entity and vice versa.  
 
With regard to the second question, there are some empirical studies indicating the advantages of decisions 
taken by diverse groups. We recall three such empirical studies: 
 
First, an empirical study conducted by Sommers (2006, pp. 497-612) establishes that a group’s racial 
composition affects its decision making through multiple processes. Through the simulation of a real trial, 
including a jury-eligible sample, voir dire, video trial presentation, jury instructions, and deliberations, Sommers 
identifies specific advantages of racial heterogenity for group decision making and demonstrates the influence of 
race-relevant jury selection questions on subsequent trial judgments.  
 
Second, an empirical study conducted by Page (2008) led to the creation of a theoretical framework to 
explain why groups often outperform experts. On the basis of several experiments, Page formulated the Diversity 
Trumps Ability Theorem. He stated that given four conditions, “a randomly selected collection of problem 
solvers outperforms a collection of the best individual problem solvers” (2008, p. 162). The four conditions are: 
(1) the problem has to be hard, (2) the people have to be smart, (3) the people have to be diverse, (4) the group 
size has to be bigger than a handful and chosen from a larger population. Page’s theorem is based on the 
observation that people of high ability are a homogenous group. Most of them have been trained in the same 
institutions, and they tend to possess similar perspectives and apply similar problem solving techniques.  
According to Page, the theorem is not a mere metaphor or cute empirical anecdote that may or not be true ten 
years from now. He stated that it is a logical truth (Page, 2008, p. 162).  
 
Third, in 2007, the logic of the Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem was anticipated and demonstrated by 
Lakhani and Jeppesen (2007). They investigated how the scientific problems at Innocentive 
(http://www.innocentive.com), an "open innovation" company that takes research and development problems in 
a broad range of scientific domains, were solved. They looked at 166 scientific problems that had stymied the 
R&D labs at 26 separate firms.  The results were contrary to decades of conventional wisdom in science, because 
the people that were least expected to solve a problem were exactly the ones who most likely were able to solve 
it. 
4.2 Incentives  
Below, we distinguish five types of incentives that can motivate the crowd to participate in CODR.  
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The first incentive is the sense of service to the community. For instance, Rule and Nagarajan (2010) 
established that, in spite of the eBay’s initial concerns that there would not be many applicants to be jurors in the 
ECRF, they received more than sufficient applications to support their case volume. eBay planned certain 
initiatives to be provided to jurors as an award for their work, but no incentive playouts were needed because the 
jurors were willing to participate out of their sense of service to the community.  
 
The second incentive is the financial remuneration. According to a study by Ipeirotis (2008), thirty-four 
percent of the crowdsourced workers in the Amazon Mechanical Turk listed in the survey that they participate 
for “Pocket Change / Extra Cash” as a motivation and forty-nine percent listed “Income Purposes”. So, it can be 
seen that a large part of the turkers are motivated by the financial profit. In this regard, it should be noted that the 
wages of the crowdsourced workers are typically quite low (Felstiner, 2010, p. 24). At present, there are no 
CODR providers that offer remuneration for participating in a crowd. However, offering remuneration to the 
members of the crowd is theoretically possible. Legally, this can be done by providing that the members of the 
crowd have the status of independent contractors.  
 
The third incentive is the credit which the author will receive as a result of her contribution to the 
community. If the decisions of the cases are published in the online communities together with the name of the 
people that have decided the cases, the incentive will be similar to the incentive of the contributors in Wikipedia 
and the incentive system observed in the scientific community. Publishing of CODR decisions will 
simultaneously promote the consistency between the decisions. However, it should be noted that the traditional 
notion of the arbitration proceedings is that the arbitral awards and proceedings are confidential. The same 
notion is valid for mediation. It should be noted, however, that while the notion of confidentiality is valid for the 
legally binding arbitration, there are no obstacles to publish the decisions rendered by procedures using non-
binding arbitration. Publishing such decisions will guarantee the information equality of the parties, allows 
scrutiny as quality assurance and will allow the law develop rationally and consistently (Hörnle, 2009, pp. 144-
149). A typical example of a non-binding arbitration procedure of which the decisions are published is UDRP. It 
should be noted that the UDRP decisions are not only published but also classified in an informal overview 
issued in 2005.4 The important role of this overview for promoting consistency among UDRP decisions can be 
seen from several cases rendered by UDRP panelists.5   
 
The fourth incentive for participating in CODR is the interest in the knowledge on the dispute resolution 
process which the members of the crowd will gain if they participate in CODR. Later, the members of the crowd 
may wish to complain or respond to a claim in the same CODR platform. 
 
The fifth incentive for participating in CODR could be the entertainment which CODR can provide. For 
instance,  according to the abovementioned study by Ipeirotis (2008), twenty-one percent of the crowdsourced 
workers in the Mechanical Turk listed as their choice “to kill time” and forty-two percent listed “Entertainment”. 
4.3 Types of disputes which can be solved through CODR 
 
We distinguish two main types of disputes which can be solved through CODR. First, CODR procedures can be 
designed to solve offline disputes, such as civil disputes, family disputes, and personal relationship disputes. 
Typical examples of CODR resolving offline disputes are CODR procedures functioning as online opinion polls. 
Second, CODR can be designed to solve online disputes. In particular, it is rather suitable for solving (1) e- 
                                                          
4
 WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions (23 March 2005), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview/index.html . 
5
 Fresh Intellectual properties, Inc v 800Network.com, Inc, WIPO Case D2005-0061 (21 March 2005);  Wellquest 
International, Inc v Nicholas Clark, WIPO Case No D2005-0552 (19 July 2005);  Alain-Martin  Pierret v Sierra Technology 
Group, LLC, eeParts, Inc v E E All Parts Corp NAF Case No FA481753 (14 July 2005);  Stevland Morris v Unofficial Fan 
Club, NAF Case No FA453986 (22 June 2005); 
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commerce disputes, (2) disputes in global online job marketplaces, (3) social networks, and (4) virtual worlds. 
Below we discuss all four of them. 
 
(1) CODR is suitable for solving e-commerce disputes arising from transactions in online auctions, such as 
eBay or Amazon because, when such an auction needs to solve 60 million disputes per year, as it is the 
case of eBay, dispute resolution providers that work by providing dispute resolution through an appointed 
third neutral party cannot handle the amount of the disputes (Rule and Nagarajan, 2010, p.5).  
 
(2) CODR can be used in the global job marketplaces using crowdsourcing, such as Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk platform (www.mturk.com), oDesk (www.odesk.com), Elance (www.elance.com), Freelancer 
(http://www.freelancer.com), that allow businesses to hire remote workers.  In these websites, disputes 
may arise on whether or not the contractor was working on the appropriate contract, whether the quality of 
her work is on the required level, and whether she was paid for it.  
 
(3) Other places well suited for using CODR are the social sites as Facebook and MySpace (Schmitz, 2010, 
p.230). In these places, disputes concerning insults can be resolved by CODR.  
 
(4) Because CODR does not require a presence of professional judges, arbitrators or mediators, it can be used 
in the virtual worlds, such as Second Life (www.secondlife.com), There (www.there.com), and Active 
Worlds (www.activeworlds.com), which are populated by millions of “residents”. Since, in such worlds, 
there could be a huge amount of disputes concerning relationship matters, intellectual property rights, and 
even virtual property, CODR seems to be an appropriate type of dispute resolution process because only 
the members of the virtual worlds are often familiar with some virtual interactions and transactions 
(Fairfield, 2008, pp. 429-433; Schmitz, 2010, pp. 230-232). 
 
4.4 The CODR procedure 
  
To clarify the CODR procedure, we will first answer the question who is the designer of a CODR procedure 
(4.4.1). Then, on the basis of six criteria we distinguish 14 types of CODR procedures (4.4.2). Subsequently, we 
will examine the four stages that are typical for every CODR procedure, namely, filling the complaint, notifying 
the respondent, reaching a decision, enforcement of the decision (4.4.3). 
4.4.1 The designer of the CODR procedure 
While ODR procedures are typically designed by an ODR provider, CODR procedures can be designed from the 
members of the online communities where CODR is used. This will underline their function as a form of direct 
democracy in the online communities. As Rainey (2009) points out, the more input and diversity in the 
development process, the less any one person or small group’s perspective will dominate the application’s 
functionality.   
4.4.2 Types of CODR procedures 
We use six criteria to distinguish 14 types of CODR procedures. These 14 procedures are numbered from 1 to 
14. 
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Criterion 1: Mechanism used for solving disputes 
With regard to the mechanism used for solving disputes, four types of CODR can be distinguished, namely, 
CODR solving disputes through litigation, arbitration, mediation, and negotiation. 
 
(1) CODR solving disputes through litigation 
At present, there are no pure forms of CODR that solve disputes through litigation, but there are proposals 
for replacing the traditional juries in the civil procedures by cyber juries, which would be a form of CODR 
(Marder, 2005). However, it should be noted that the existence of cyber juries does not lead automatically 
to qualifying the procedure as a CODR. Yet, if they are chosen by the local community or an even broader 
community through an open call, it is an indicator for the existence of a CODR procedure. 
(2) CODR solving disputes through arbitration 
Up to this moment, CODR is used to solve disputes only through a non-binding form of arbitration. ECRF 
offers such a non-binding form of arbitration. This form of CODR never produces a legally binding award.   
(3) CODR solving disputes through mediation 
At present, there is no CODR that uses mediation as a mechanism for solving disputes, but such forms can 
be created in the future. For instance, the crowd in a CODR procedure solving disputes through mediation 
can be a group of people having knowledge and experience allowing them to perform functions of 
mediators. Here, we refer to our explanation of closed CODR mentioned below. 
(4) CODR solving disputes through negotiation 
The reason a person negotiates with someone else is to produce better results than would occur otherwise. 
Consequently, knowing The Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is an important step 
for the success of negotiation (Lodder and Zeleznikow, 2010, pp.41-43). In this regard, a CODR procedure 
can be designed in such a way that it will allow the crowd to give its opinion on the BATNA. The crowd’s 
opinion may remove any unrealistic optimistic expectations with regard to other mechanisms of dispute 
resolution, such as arbitration and litigation. As a result, the negotiation proceedings offered by such a 
CODR procedure can be more successful than the negotiation proceedings offered by an ODR procedure. 
 
 
Criterion 2: Conditions that the crowd should satisfy in order to participate in CODR 
 
 On the basis of  the conditions which participants in CODR should satisfy to participate in CODR, we 
distinguish: (5) open CODR and (6) closed CODR. 
 
(1) Open CODR  
In the open CODR, everyone can participate in the process of solving disputes. The three websites 
SideTaker, AllRise, and iCourthouse can be regarded as providing open CODR procedures because they 
allow everyone to become a juror. In fact, all of the present open CODR procedures are simply online 
opinion polls which are not attached to certain online communities, but function as autonomous dispute 
resolution platforms. It should be noted, however, that, in the future, open CODR can lead to transforming 
unregulated communities into self-regulated communities.  
(2) Closed CODR  
 
In a closed CODR, disputes are solved only from a group of people that satisfies certain requirements. The 
reason for adding certain requirements to the participation in a CODR procedure is to gather a crowd that 
has sufficient knowledge for solving certain disputes. From Plato’s days to the present, knowledge has 
been a personal accomplishment, but, nowadays, there is a gradual change leading to the idea that  
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knowledge is also a commodity, which can be bought, sold, managed, invested in, leveraged, and deployed (cf. 
O’Hara, 2002, p.64).  
 
What a closed CODR procedure tries to achieve is, by adding specific requirements for participating as a 
crowd in the dispute resolution process, to solve disputes by more effectively managing, leveraging, buying, 
selling, and deploying the knowledge of the internet society, which allows solving disputes only by competent 
members of the crowd. This idea completely crashes the old idea that CODR is a procedure in which disputes are 
solved only by laypersons.  
 
In contrast, a closed CODR procedure allows solving disputes by highly educated persons.  Indeed, the 
parties may use a traditional dispute resolution process, including ODR, and chose a third neutral party having 
specific knowledge that is required for solving the particular dispute. However, at least in our opinion, a closed 
CODR will better manage and leverage knowledge than the traditional dispute resolution procedures. This is 
because a closed CODR procedure may automatically examine a huge amount of data concerning different 
persons in order to find the right members of the crowd. Moreover, it can provide a decision that is made from a 
diverse group of people that is specially gathered for the particular dispute.  
 
A typical example of a closed CODR procedure is the ECRF that requires only people having certain 
experience in eBay to participate as a crowd in the dispute resolution process. Yet, it should be noted that a 
closed CODR procedure can be used not only in open communities, such as eBay, but also in private 
communities, such as Covisint, founded in 2000, which amalgamated together the systems of GM, Daimler 
Chrysler, and Ford. Each of these companies brought together their individual e-business initiates which led to 
the formation of a single global business-to-business supplier community. By January 2003, this community had 
over 77 000 members spread over more than 2600 companies (Plant, 2004, p. 59).  
 
 
  Criterion 3: The number of members of the crowd: fixed or not fixed 
 
With regard to the number of crowd members, a CODR procedure can be (7) a CODR procedure in which the 
number of crowd members is fixed and (8) a CODR procedure in which the number of crowd members is not 
fixed. 
 
(1) CODR procedure with a fixed number of crowd members 
 
This kind of CODR can provide a fast resolution of disputes because the result can be reached within 
minutes or hours. For instance, in the ECRF, the group that directly takes the decision is composed of 7 
jurors. If the first 4 people vote in favor of one of the parties, the case will be closed and a decision 
rendered. 
 
(2) CODR procedure with a not fixed number of crowd members 
 
This kind of CODR allows every member of the crowd that is entitled to participate in the dispute 
resolution process to participate within a certain period of time. After the time has elapsed, a decision is 
rendered. However, in the case that a CODR procedure uses voting, a problem can arise if an equal 
amount of members vote for both parties. In this case, the dispute has not been resolved. An eventual 
solution to this problem is to create a second tour, but it will slow down the process of dispute 
resolution.  
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Criterion 4: Composition of a third neutral party in the process of  dispute resolution  
 
(3) ) Mixed CODR  
 
The third neutral party in a CODR procedure could be composed of a combination between appointed 
professional arbitrators, judges, or mediators and jurors from the crowd. For instance, the third neutral 
party in the process can be composed of 3 appointed arbitrators and 30 cyber jurors chosen by an open 
call. The appointed judges, arbitrators, or mediators can instruct the juries on the law before they begin 
their deliberations, answer questions that the jury might have during its deliberations, and suggest to the 
online jurors that they should take the vote on the basis of “evidence-driven deliberations” (Marder, 
2006, p. 266). The appointed neutrals can also ensure that the jury will not conduct its deliberations free 
from professional observation. Moreover, they can avoid formation of coalitions. A mixed CODR 
would exist, for example, if the traditional juries are replaced by cyber juries who are chosen by a local 
community through an open call.  
 
(4) Pure CODR 
A pure CODR procedure is a procedure in which the third neutral   party is composed from a crowd 
only.  
 
 
Criterion 5: Use of deliberations between the members of the crowd 
 
(5) CODR allowing deliberations between the members of the crowd 
According to Surowiecki (2005, p. xix) groups benefit from members talking to and learning from each 
other, but too much communication, he states, can make the group as a whole less intelligent. The 
reason for this is group polarization, which means that, after deliberation, people are likely to move 
toward a more extreme point in the direction to which the group’s members were originally inclined 
(Sunstein, 2009, p.60). An effect of the group polarization is the decrease of the diversity of opinions in 
the group which leads to a decision that, as mentioned above, has some disadvantages compared to a 
decision taken by a group having diverse opinions (Sunstein, 2009, p.62). It should also be noted that, 
according to an experiment, polarization is highly likely to occur in an extreme level when group 
membership is made salient and people have a high degree of anonymity (Sunstein, 2009, p. 70).  
 
 
(6) CODR not allowing deliberations 
At present, all of the existing CODR procedures do not allow the members of the crowd to deliberate.  
 
 
Criterion 6: The number of members of the crowd 
 
(7) CODR in which the crowd is a small group of people 
A CODR procedure in which the crowd is a small group of people allows easily communication 
between its members. Deliberations can straightforwardly be conducted in a group of 5 to 7 people. 
However, small groups cannot offer a large variety of opinions.  
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(8) CODR in which the crowd is a  large group of people 
The main advantage of large groups is the diversity of opinions (or solutions) that their members offer. 
However, these groups are often difficult to manage (Surowiecki, 2005, p. xix). Also, the members of 
the crowd in a large group may have difficulties communicating with each other in “real” time. Indeed, 
from the chess game Kasparov versus the World, it can be seen that a discussion concerning a certain 
future decision is possible even amongst 50,000 people. In this game, which was played in 1999 over 
the Internet, Garry Kasparov, playing the white pieces, met the World Team which took its decisions, 
after a consultation in an online forum, on the basis of a plurality vote (Nalimov, Wirth, Haworth, 1999; 
Fadul, 2008, p. 99). A similar “consultation” can be conducted in a closed CODR procedure. However, 
such a “consultation” cannot be regarded as a form of deliberations, because the latter are conducted in 
a private environment and in  “real” time. While a CODR procedure can restrict the access to such a 
forum to people that are not mediators/adjudicators, conducting “real” time deliberations between the 
members of a large group of people seems difficult. 
4.4.3 Stages of CODR procedure 
A CODR procedure consists normally of four stages, namely, (1) filling a complaint, (2) notifying the 
respondent, (3) reaching a decision/ recommendation/agreement, and (4) enforcing the decision/agreement.  
 
   The first stage of a CODR procedure is the filling of a complaint. It should be said that if the crowd 
participates in a CODR procedure as a third neutral party the complaint should not only be convenient for filling 
out, but easy to understand by the crowd. Otherwise, there is a risk that the decision will be taken irrationally by 
the crowd. Also, since disputants or members of the crowd may have difficulties understanding the complaint, 
there should be someone who is able to clarify the complaint to them.  In a CODR procedure, this can be done 
either by appointed experts who will contact disputants and members of the crowd or by using another body built 
on the crowdsourcing principle.  Since, using appointed experts will make the procedure expensive and slow, a 
good way for clarifying the complaint to the disputants and the crowd is by using another body built on the 
crowdsourcing principle. However, since the group of people participating in such body can also have 
difficulties understanding the complaint, it should be composed only from people having a legal or another 
background ensuring a good understanding of the complaint. 
 
The second stage of a CODR procedure is notifying the respondent. But who should inform the respondent? 
They are two variants – (1) another body using crowdsourcing or (2) a CODR platform that is designed in such a 
way that automatically sends a notification to the respondent’s email/profile provided by claimant. The first 
variant is not used in any of the current CODR platforms. Another body using crowdsourcing will be able to 
search for contact information of the respondent if it is not provided by the claimant or if provided contact 
information is not accurate. However, if the members of the crowd that solve a particular dispute have access to 
the contact information of the claimant, this will threat their impartiality, because they will be able to contact the 
claimant outside the CODR platform. As regards the second variant for notifying the respondent, it is used in all 
of the present CODR procedures.  
 
The third stage of a CODR procedure is reaching decision/recommendation/agreement. Here, two 
clarifications need to be made. First, assuming that the crowd has the function of a mediator or adjudicator it 
should be clarified how it will lead the CODR process. Second, it should be clarified how the crowd will reach 
decision / recommendation or how it would help the parties to reach an agreement. 
  
 As for the first clarification, at present, all of the open CODR procedures, allow every member of the crowd 
to ask questions to the parties. However, if a crowd is composed from many people and allows everyone to ask 
questions, the procedure will be extremely slow and cumbersome. Imagine that every member of a crowd  
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composed from 100 people asks questions to the parties. Obviously, answering to every question can take a large 
amount of time, especially if the procedure allows rebuttal and surrebuttal. The first solution to this problem is to  
ask the parties only questions put forward by the majority of the crowd. However, in this case, the questions will 
not reflect the opinions of the entire group. The second solution is to allow only some randomly chosen members 
of the crowd to ask questions. This idea seems plausible, but the small group of people entitled to ask questions 
will again not reflect the opinions of a diverse crowd.  The third solution is to allow some of the members of the 
crowd which best reflect the diversity of the group to ask questions. In order to find members of the crowd which 
best reflect the diversity of the group, certain questionnaire can be given to the crowd and, on the basis of the 
results, the CODR platform can automatically find a representative group.  
 
With regard to the second clarification, if CODR uses adjudication, the final decision can be taken after an 
aggregation of decisions taken by the crowd. The aggregation of decisions is an easy process which can be 
automatized, as it is in the case of the ECRF. However, if CODR allows deliberation, a group polarization and 
cybercascades can occur and lead to irrational decisions. If it does not allow deliberations, the opinion of a 
minority of the crowd may not be taken into account by the majority of the crowd. It will lead to a decision that 
reflects only the majority of the crowd, but not the entire group. CODR can be also designed to solve disputes by 
using cooperation, which means that there would be no voting at all. Members of the crowd can provide their 
opinions which, without aggregating or modification, can be sent to the parties. Such dispute resolution process 
reflects the opinions of the whole group, but it cannot render a definitive decision. In fact, such a process can 
straightforwardly provide recommendations for solving the dispute to the disputants. Such a CODR procedure 
should not be underestimated. Recommendations can be quite helpful to the disputants because they can 
facilitate a settlement of the dispute. If CODR uses mediation or negotiation, the parties and mediator or 
facilitator may use information provided by the crowd in order to facilitate the process and reach a decision. For 
instance, the crowd’s opinion may better inform them about their BATNA, which will facilitate the dispute 
resolution process. 
 
The fourth stage of CODR is the enforcement of the decision. In this regard, it must be said that the outcome 
of a CODR procedure can be a recommendation, agreement, or a decision. If it is a recommendation, obviously, 
there is no need for enforcement. If it is an agreement, it will be binding on the two parties on the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda. If the CODR procedure leads to decisions, they can be enforced by private authorities. Such 
enforcement can be quite effective and should not be underestimated.  Since the CODR procedure is in an 
experimental phase, at present, its decisions are not legally binding. 
5. Conclusion  
 
The process of solving disputes by collective intelligence is in its infancy. Taking into account the ECRF, CODR 
will probably become in the future the online judicial system of the online communities. They need such a 
judicial system because the basic principle of virtual communities is that the problems must be solved as much 
as possible within the online community itself (Kokswijk, 2010, p.241).   
 
However, at present, the spread of CODR is limited not only by the lack of information about its existence, 
but also because of the lack of a theoretical framework of CODR that can be used for designing CODR 
platforms. In this regard, the present paper provides a basic outline of such a theoretical framework by 
identifying and discussing four building blocks of every CODR system.  
 
On the basis of our analysis above, we may conclude that, providing fast, democratic, and cheap dispute 
resolution, CODR has a potential that needs to be explored.  CODR may set forth a new era in the dispute 
resolution. We speculate this to be an era in which disputes will be solved by the collective intelligence of 
world’s citizens.  
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